FARM SIZE, RISK AVERSION AND THE ADOPTION OF NEW TECHNOLOGY UNDER
UNCERTAINTY* By GERSHON FEDER THE introduction of high yield cultivation techniques in agriculture during the sixties, and the socio-economic impact of these innovations on LDC's agricultural sector have been a subject of considerable interest to economists. At present, a substantial body of literature exists on various micro and macro economic aspects of this so-called green revolution. However, while many works provide detailed description of the experience of different regions, and propose various arguments to explain observed patterns of behavior (which are not the same in all areas), there seems to be a need for a more rigorous analysis. This will enable clarification of the interrelationships between several observed variables, and will help to define in more precise terms the conditions under which certain arguments are valid. For example. risk and risk-aversion have been used to explain differences in input use and the relative rate of adoption of modern technologies by farmers of different sizes. But different patterns of behavior are observed in different iegions, and thus the impact of risk and risk-aversion needs to be examined in relation to other factors and constraints which may exist in the system in certain areas but not in other areas. Furthermore, the notion of risk-aversion should be defined more finely, as will be shown in the present paper.
Using traditional economic terminology, it would seem that the availability of a new production technology (in addition to the old one)-embodied in the use of hybrid seeds or new crops, fertilizers, pesticides and proper timing of production activities--presents the farmer with a typical portfolio selection problem: The choice of an optimal mixture of risky activities differing in both risk ness and expected returns. But unlike the simple portfolio problcrln the farmer has some degree of control on both the level of risk and the mean return, through the use of inputs such as fertilizer. There are several interesting questions related to this decision problem: How are factor use and output mix affected by attitudes towards risk? Are there lifferences between farms of different sizes? Are standard results of the theory of the firm still valid and under what conditions? What are the implications of credit constraints on factor use and output mix? How is income distrihlution ifTc ttcd? * T'le author is indebted to P. H-a7ell, P. L. Scandizzo and to an anonymous referee for helpfful comments.
The views and inteipret:uions in this dot:ament are those of the autilor and should not be attributed to the World Bank, to its afliliated organi7afinons or to any individual acting on their behalf.
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The present paper derives answers to these questions in the framework' of a formal model of production under uncertainty. The model, whichi is presented in the next section, can apply to a variety of topics involving production uncertainty. The analysis of model implications in the following sections provides possible explanations to observed behavior in various regions which have experienced the introduction of new crops. Following a discussion of the role of a credit constraint, some income distribution aspects are considered.
The model
The farmer is assumed to own a farm of a given size, say L acres, which can be allocated between two crops. The first is a low yield crop, which utilizes traditional techniques, and, in particular, does not require chemical inputs. Another importayit characteristic of the traditional crop is the lack of uncertainty regarding yields. The second crop, which will be referred to as the "modern crop," is a high yield variety, or a cash crop, utilizing modern inputs such as fertilizers and improved seeds. On the other hand, it is more vulnerable to weather variations so that there is some degree of uncertainty regarding the yield. Additional (and subjective) uncertainty follows from the fact that the farmer is less familiar with the modern crop. Considering this factor, the modern crop may be viewed as more risky even if in reality it is no more succeptible to extreme weather situations than the traditional crop. Indeed, in some cases the modern crop may be more robust than traditional varieties. The case considered here, however, is that in which total uncertainty (from all sources) of the modern crop, is higher. There is ample support in the literature to substantiate this point. For instance, Dalrymple (1978) notes that HYV technology requires a well regulated supply of water and thus "the attainment of the full potential of the HYV's without undue risk requires an assured water supply" (p. 8). Similarly, Schutjer and Van der Veen (1977) conclude in their survey that "the adoption of (nlew) agricultural technology may require the adopter to accept a greater degree of risk and uncertainty... The new wheat and rice varieties introduced in the mid 1960's probably increased the uncertainty facing farmers by . . introducing genetic homogeneity in the variety planted." (p. 23). The role of higher sul?jective risk is emphasized by Lipton (1978) who notes that "risk is in the eye of the beholder ... for the farmer familiar only with traditional varieties, it is the HYVs' subjective risk that counts." Similar views are expressed by O'Mara (1979, p. 9-2) . The mean net return per acre of the modern crop is considerably above the (certain) return from the traditional crop.'
The characterization above is obviously a major simplification. It can be shown, however, that within the framework of the model to be presented below, results are not affected if the traditional crop uses chemical inputs and is subject to uncertainty, as long as its mean yield response to chemicals is lower than that of the modern crop, and its degree of yield uncertainty is lower than that of the modern crop. There is therefore no loss of generality in adopting the simplified characterization above, while the gain in terms of convenience in mathematical manipulations is substantial.
The chemical input referred to in this paper is fertilizer, while pesticid s,s are related to a different type of uncertainty (infestation levels and pest damage), and will not be treated in the present paper.
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Considering the impact of fertilizers on the modern crop (assuming a fixed input of land and other factors), it is well known that mean output increases with the input of fertilizers, although at a decreasing rate. Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that the degree of yield variability (i.e., the degree of uncertainty) increases with the level of fertilizers [Day (1965) , Fuller (1965) and more recently Just and Pope (1979) ]. Ignoring, for simplicity, all other inputs except for land, one may expect that for a given amount of fertilizer, an increase in the scale of production, (i.e., an increase in the area cultivated) will increase both mean output (with a diminishing rate) and the variability of output. A general formulation of a production function exhibiting such properties can be givern, following Just and Pope (1978) by
QY(L,X)±+sH(L,X)
(1) 
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Adopting the assumption of constant returns to scale in the mean output function [which is supported by the discussions of Sidhu (1974 ), von Blanckenburg (1972 and Shetty (1969) ], and assuming in addition that the risk componepn , acre (HIL) is a function of the fertilizer/land ratio only, the following pŽ duction function (in per acre terms) is obtained
where q-QIL. yv YIL, It HIL, x X/L, and the following properties apply, on the basis of (2) and (3),
The production technology for the traditional crop is simply a fixed net \ I.anciai return of R dollars per acre ailocated to that crop. Two additional pi -xs need to be definedL in the system, namely, P, which denotes the price per unit of the modern crop, and c, deniotinig the cost per unit of fertilizer.
Assuming that the farmer's objective is to maximize the expected utility of income, it is reasonable to characterize the utility function as strictly concave, reflecting risk aversion, i.e., U= U(7r); U'>0; U '"<-(0 (6) where U denotes utility and 7r denotes income. The objective function is then given by
LsL where E is the expectations operator and L is farm size. Three observations mav be made at this point: The first relates to the specification of the production function. One standard specification which is common in the liter-ature assumes a multiplicative random effect [Batra (1974) ], i.e., 
Thus the Just-Pope formulation of the produl1ion fLinction ineluides the special case of a mutniplicative randlon variable. In the latter case, however, the elasticities of v(x) and h-(x) with respect to x are identical. Secondly, it is nloted that the objective furnctioni above belongs in a general class of problems discussed by Feder (1977) . The latter paper developed several general properties of the optimal solution which will be of use in the analysis of the present model. Finally, the relation between the decision variables (L and x) and riskiness merits attention. It is obvious from the specification of the production function that increases in L and x (or increases in L and X) increase output variability. But it can further be shown that higher values of these variables imply increases in riskiness in the Rothschild-Stiglitz sense. That is, if L or x are increased while average income is maintained tinchanged (through a compensatory lump-sum subsidy or tax), the expected utility level of a risk-averse farmer will decline, and he would reject such a change. A risk-neutral decision maker would be indifferent regarding this change. This point is demonstrated in detail in Appendix A.
Maximization of the objective function above withi respect to L and x requires the following first order conditions (excluding corner solutions):
The Hessian matrix (denoted by M) of equations (7), (8) can be written as
Second order conditions for a maximum require that the determinant of M(IMI) be positive, i.e.,
By the concavity of LI, E(U"-A 2 )< 0. Thus (hla) will hold if By Feder (1977, Lemma 1) [E(U'-E)IEU']<0. Condition (1ib) can thus possibly be maintained with both concave or convex h. Obviously, hl"l¢() is sufficient (but not necessary) for second order conditions to hold. Essentially, 'llb) implies a requirement on the relative rates of reduction in the margini I contribution of inputs to mean yield and variability, if a maximum is to be reached. In loose terms, a maximum solution can be obtained if the marginal mean productivity decreases faster than the marginal contribution to the risk component (h). It will be assumed throughout the paper that condition (llb) holds.
Theptimal input of fertilizer
We turn now to investigate the implications of equation (9). Substituting for A and G, equation (9) yields
Equation (12) holds only when x and L are at their optimal values (say, x* and L*). It is noted, however, that only x* enters in (12), which thus suffices to characterize the optimal solution for the rate of fertilization per acre. To see that equation (12) defines a unique solution for x*, denote the left hand side of (12) as +f(x) and differentiate
From equation (7) one can obtain P-hFE(U'-e)/EU'=R+c x-P-y, The proofs for these assertions follow simply from the fact that parameters of the utility function, distribution of E or farm size do not appear in equation (12) which defines x*.
As will become apparent, these results imply a two-stage decision approach: The farmer decides first how much fertilizer should be applied per acre on the basis of technical (the production function) and price considerations. The marginal optimization condition related to this decision is not affected by risk since the ratio of the marginal risk effects of fertilizers and land is independent of risk. The second stage decision relates to the scale of operations (amount of land in risky production), and in that stage factors pertinent to risk (such as farm size and risk attitudes) have an impact.
It should be noted that a different behavioural model can yield different results. For instance, it can be shown that a farmer operating with a minimax G. FEDER 269 principle will use less fertilizers per acre than a risk neutral farmer. 5 The results presented in the text are consistent with an expected utility model only.
The empirical evidence which is of relevance to Assertions (1)- (3) is not conclusive. Barker et al. (1971) and Roumasset (1976 p. 92) report that in the Philippines they found no significant relation between the use of chemical inputs and farm size. Farm size is usually believed to be negatively related to some notion of risk aversion. Thus, both assertions (1) and (3) seem to be validated by these findiri,.-. However, in other areas it was observed that larger farmers applied more fertilizer per acre than smaller farmers [(Cutie (1976) , Rao (1975, p. 45) ]. One might have been tempted to rationalize the latter case by the hypothesis that smaller farmers are more risk averse, and, since fertilizers increase risk, these farmers would tend to use les's of that input per acre (Lipton 1978, p. 323) . As is evident from assertions (1)- (3), this argument by itself is not a valid explanation, and different lines of argument (such as credit constraints) should be used.'
Equation (12) can be used to derive the relation between the optimal level of fertilizer per acre and other par meters of the model. Two paramneters are of particular interest, since they have been at the center of policy mleasulres designed to promote the adoption of modern crops. These are the price of the modern crop, and the cost of fertilizer. In many developing countries, the modern crop is subsidized, while various measures amount to eitlhe direct or indirect subsidy to purchasers of chemical inputs.
Differentiation of equation (12) with respect to c, the cost of fertilizers, yields dx*/dc = (h -x* -h')ItIi (14) Noting that h-xh'=aH/aL>O (by 3a) , it follows that dx*/dc<O, namely, the fertilizer/land ratio is negatively related to the cost of fertilizers, as expected.
The other parameter of interest is P, the price of the modern crop. Differentiation of (12) yields dx*/dP (yh'-hy')Iqj, h-y . (15) where p. x* h'/h; q -x* y'/y, the respective elasticities of the risk and mean yield components with respect to fertilizer. Recall that in the special case of multiplicative random variable (i,e., the case q = Of(x) discussed earlier) the two elasticities are equal (p = ). Thus, in the latter special case As the empirical results of Just and Pope (1979) indicate, it seems that "the elasticity for variability is much lower than the elasticity for the mean of yield" (p. 19). It follows then that in practice a higher price for the modern crop will induce a more entensive use of fertilizer per acre. Theoretically, however, if the risk effect of fertilizer dominates its yield increasing effect (i.e., ,t > -), a higher price will allow the farmer increased profits with a lower per acre fertilizer input, thus reducinig the level of risk (ceteris paribus,.
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The optimal allocation of land
The earlier discussion established the point that risk considerations have no effect on the decision regarding optimal input of fertilizer per acre, even though that amount affects the level of risk confronted by the farmer. It musc be concluded, therefore, that the impact of risk (and risk aversion) is reP--cted in the other control variable, namely, the area allocated to the cultivation of the modern crop.
The impact of risk-aversion, for instance, can be studied by assuming a specific form of the utility function. Consider the constant relative risk aversion specification 7 U( 'r) /rI -(-1 a), ( < a < 1 (16) where a is the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion. The larger is a, the more risk averse is the farmer. C'-1 culating U' from (16), substituting in (7) and differentiating with respect to a-, one obtains (r-,ting that, by assertion 1, x* is unchanged) dL
The denominator of (17) is obviously negative. The numerator can be shown to be positivc, 8 and therefore dL*/da <0. A similar result can be ' The concepts of relative and absolute risk aversion will be used extensively in the analysis. The reader is referred to the seminal articles by Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1971) for a discussion of these measures. In a nutshell, absolute risk aversion (given by -U`/tt') measures the insistence of a risk averse individual for more-than-fair odds when faced with a bet whereby he can win or lose a given sUm of money. Relative risk aversion (given by -U"' 7r/U') measures the same insistence when the bet is such that a given proportiorl of weal.h or income can be won or lost.
' The sign of the nunrerator is cstablished as follows: Define e such that A(E*)= 0. With gien optimal values (x*,L*) it holds U' A(r'>0 for all E>e* while (s<s*)> [U'"A(e)<)]. Also, (e>F*)o[ln U(s)>ln U(e*)J and (e<s')z>[n U(e)<ln U(F*)]. It follows, then, that U' .A( ,-ln U(e)> U' A(6) 1n U(e*) for all Ej e*. Taking expectations of both sides of the latter inequality and noting that U(s*) is constant and E(U'-A)=O (by equation (7)), it is concluded that E(U' Aln U)>0. obtained for a constant absolute risk aversion utility function of the form U(-rr)= 1-eCO (where f3 is a parameter measuring absolute risk aversion).
It was thus demonstrated that
Assertioni 5: The optimal allocation of land for the moderrn crop diecli,tes with higher degrees of risk aversion.
Increased variability of the random factor e (represented by a mean preserving spread of its distribution) will cause a reduction of L* (and therefore also a reduction of expected output).
9 It follows that if smaller farmers face higher levels of uncertainty (because of limited access to sources of information or because of inability to secure risk reducing infrastructure such as irrigation) they will plant less of the modern crop, ceteris paribus. The results in Assertions (5) and (6) are intuitive once it was established that the yield per acre of the two crops is unaffected by changes in uncertainty or risk-aversion. The farmer faces a simple portfolio problem with two prospects, one of which is risky, and a fixed size of funds (land). Naturally, the higher is risk-aversion or the degree of risk, the smaller will be the amount of the risky prospect acquired by a risk-averse decision maker.
The effect of the holding size (L) on the allocation of area between the two crops depends on the relation between absolute risk aversion and income. Using the results on Feder (1977, Theorem 3) , and given the fact that x* is independent of L (Assertion 3 above) one can show that L* increases with holding size provided that absolute risk aversion declines with income as argued by Arrow (1971) . It is thus expected that land allocation to the modern crop increases with farm size. A variable of interest is then the relative share of modern crop area relative to farm size. Denote the latter by l*(-L*/L), and differentiate equation (7) (recalling that x* is fixed), obtaining
where 7r denotes (as before) income. Since the denominator of (18) is positive, the sign is determined by the numerator. The latter can be shown to be positive, zero or negative, depending on whether relative risk aversion is decreasing, constant or increasing with income.'" Arrow (1971, p. 98) Muthia (1971) found that small and medium sized farms in South-India contributed a larger share in total acreage planted to HYV than their share in total cultivated area. Similar evidence is provided by Sharma (1972) . However, there is also evidence on areas where the contrary is true, namely, larger farms allocate a larger share of their land to modern crops (e.g., Rao (1975, p. 45) ). This can not be attributed, as was showvn. to higher absolute risk aversion among smaller farmers, and a different explanation will he provided. The discussion above is summarized in the foltowing: The optimal behavior pattern established by Assertions (1)-(3) and (5)- (7) indicates a separation between the land allocation and fertilizer intensity decisions: Given the prices in the system and the technology of production, the optimal amount of fertilizer per acre is determined. The optimal number of acres to be allocated to the two crops is then decided, not only on the basis of prices, but also taking in account the degree of risk and the decision makers attitude towards risk (which is usually not independent of farm size).
Since the total output of the modern crop is negatively related to risk and riskl-uversion. an immniediate policy implication is that better information dissemination regardir.g the modern crop (through extension agents, radio, etc.), which will reduce the level of subjective uncertainty, will increase the output of that crop. Similar effects will be expected when drainage and irrig-ationi projects are implemented, since these reduce objective uncertainty.
We turrn now to discuss the effects of price changes on land allocation. Differentiating equations (7) and (8) 
dL"/dc =-x[EU'+L* E(U` A)]/E(U"*A
) -L"(h'lh ) . (EU') (h -x* h')I[P *EU' (y"+-hi')]
While the sign of (19) cannot be established, the standard result of input That is, the total amount of fertilizers purchased is negatively related to the cost of fertilizers. The effect of changes in c on total expected output of the modern crop is given (using (14) and (19)) by
Given the results of equations (14) and (20), it follows that a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for dY/dc <0 is -q --j. It was already argued that empirical evidence suggests O >A, and it would thus seem that for all practical purposes d Y/dc < 0.
The second parameter of interest is the price of the modern crop, P. Differentiating (7) and (8) with respect to P yields
dL*/dP =-[E(U' q)+L*' E(U" A q)]IE(U`' A 2 ) + (h'/h) L*. (n -pk)* (ylx*) EU'I{P 'E[U' (y"+ e h`)]} --[E(U' q)+L* E(U"` A q)]/E(U"
where the second step uses equation (15).
Equation (22) implies that in general the sign of dL*/dP is undetermined. The sign of the first term can be shown to be positive if (but not only if) relative risk aversion is one or less." It is noted that according to Arrow (1971) , relative risk aversion is close to 1, thus this seems to be an acceptable assumption, which is maintained in the discussion below. The second term has the same sign as -(dx*/dP). Thus, dx*/dp-0 is a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for dL*/dP>0. Whatever the impact of increases in P on x* and L* may be, it is bound to increase total mean output of the modern crop (Y), as shown below dY/dP-y.(dL*/dP)+L*.y' .dx*/dP)
Since the first term is positive (under the condition that relative risk ' aversion (a) does not exceed 1) and the latter term is noni-negative (see equation (15)), it follows dY/dP>0.
E(LJ'q)+L*.E(U" A -q)=E{U'-q[l+U"/U')*X^(L*,A/r)]I It is uoted that T=
As for the effect of increases in P on the total quanitity of fertilizer used (X*), one can show dX*/dP L*' (dx -/dP) + x* (dL*-/dP) = x*[E( U' q)
Since (I-0>(t<1) and ( -1)>(-< ), one may conclude (using equation (15)) that sufficient conditions for (dX*/dP)>() are either Pt or fL _ 1 .
One can also show that d(L* h)/dP>t0, i.e., the overall level of risk the farmer is willing to undertake increases when the price of the modern (risky) crop increases. The increased level of risk is obtained by either increasing x* and/or increasing L*, such that L* Ih rises.
Using the results obtained in the earlier discussion some explanation may be provided to observed behavior: It is claimed that ". . . big farmers ...
generally get a better price than small ones for HYV (high yielding varieties) outputs, and pay less for their extra inputs" (Lipton, 1978, p. 320) . In that case, the preceding analysis predicts that smaller farmers will use less fertilizers per acre. and will allocate a smaller proportion of their land to the modern crop if ->11. Since in many areas such is thle observed reality, it would seem that differential prices are a factor contributing to low rates of adoption and low intensity of use of chemical inputs by smaller farmers.
The implications of liniited credit availability
The purchase of chemical inputs such as fertilizers requires a cash outlay. This is provided from the farmer's own savings and by obtaining credit. Sources of credit vary, and may include monetary institutions (either formal or informal), relatives and friends, rich farmers, etc. To the extent that sufficient credit is available (i.e., the volume of credit is at least equal to the total cost of fertilizers as implied by the preceding analysis). the model presented carlier is valid. The cost of borrowing is incluided in the parameter for the cost of fertilizer (c) and the impact of higher interest rates is reflected in the comparative static analysis for Xvariations in c. In particular, if smaller farmers pay higher intfrest rates, the precedinig discussion on the impact of differential prices applies.
There are, however, indications that in many developing areas, rural capital nmarkets are not functioning properly [Lipton (1976)] , and that at the prevailing institutional interest rates farmers would have liked to obtain more credit and buy more fertilizers. This is obviously the case in areas where credit is obtained from relatives and friends (usually for a very low interest rate) or from governmental lending agencies which charge a fixed interest, but ration credit. Even commercially oriented lenders may be observed to ration credit at a given interest rate. When such are the circumstances, the model needs to be amended by an effective constraint stating that total cash expenditures cannot exceed farmer's cash availability, the latter being composed of the farmer's own resources plus credit. It is assumed that both own resources and access to credit are proportional to the size of the farm." 2 This is so since one would expect larger farmers to have more savings, and that lenders who are concerned regarding default will accept land as a collateral, thus granting more credit to larger land owners. Denoting the cash available to the farmer from all sources by K, and the factor of proportionality by k, we have
Since it is assumed in the present discussion that the cash constraint is effective, it must also hold
namely, the amount spent on fertilizers equals cash availability. Conmbining (25) and (26) yields
Equation (27) reflects the fact that, since the total amount of spending is given, the choice of x determines L. Denoting the interest rate by r, income is now given by
The objective function can be written, using equation (27), as
and the condition for optimum (assuming an irnternal solution) is
12 The implications of deviations from this assumption will he discussed below. 13 Income is defined here as the difference between end of period and beginning of period wealth.
14 It is asstsmed that the constraint L <L (i.e., [kI(c .x)]<1) is maintained.
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Denote P(y' + e *h') 'x + R -P (y + e h) B. Second order conditions require (at the point of optimum)
(31) Given assumption (llb), second order conditions are satisfied. Using the optimum condition (30), some of the implications of a credit constraint can be analysed and compared to the results obtained when such a constraint was not binding.
It is observed, first, that while in the earlier analysis (ceteris paribus) increases in the fertilizer/land ratio were risk increasing, this is not the case at present, since the factor multiplying -is now h(x)/x and not h(x), as before.
2 <0, and thus increases in x reduce risk (for a given L). In other words, an increase in fertilizer/land ratio (x) is necessarily related to a reduction the portion of land allocated to the modern crop, since the total expenditure on fertilizers is given by the credit constraint. Thus while X is constant L declines and the function H(L, X) declines, which implies a reduction in risk as the overall risk is given by E * H(L, X). This also implies that an increase in x leads to a decline in expected output Y, since X remains unchanged while L declines, thus Y(L, X) declines. It is not surprising, then, that the impact of an increase in the level of uncertainty (represented by a mean preserving spread of the distribution of These results follow simply from the fact that as uncertainty increases the farmer seeks to reduce risk at the margin by changing the level of H(L, X) through a reduction in L (land allocated to the risky modern crop) while X is fixed by the credit constraint. The reduction in L increases the fertilizer/land ratio but reduces expected output.
Thus, even if a binding credit constraint prevails, a reduction in uncertainty (through extension services and improved irrigation and drainage facilities) will induce higher expected outputs.
15
The assertion can be verified as follows: Part a follows from Feder (1977, Corollary to Theorem I) . Part b utilizes part a and the inverse relation between x and L implied by equation (27) . Part c follows from the following derivation:
and since y'< y/x (by our assumption y" <0), the sign of d Y is the opposite of the sign of dx which has been established in part a.
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The impact of risk aversion can be studied using a utility function specification as in equation (16) in the first order condition (30) and differentiating with respect to a (the parameter of relative risk aversion):
While the denominator is positive [see equation (31)], the numerator can be shown to be negative" 6 and thus dx*/da >0 and [in view of equation (27)] dL*/dct <0. This result is expected since an increase in x reduces risk. Using derivation similar to that of Assertion 8, one can also show dY/da < 0. Parallel results are obtained with a utility function which exhibits constant absolute risk aversion. It is thus concluded:
Assertion 9 The effect of farm size is of major interest within the present discussion, since size represents here not only income (and thus attitudes towards risk), but also access to credit. Differentiating equation (30) Thus, the existence of a credit constraint may be one explanation to the fact that in many areas larger farmers are observed to apply more fertilizers per acre than smaller farmers [Cutie (1976) ]. This is different from the result obtained earlier (Assertion 3) indicating that in the absence of credit constraints farm size does not affect fertilizer use. The reason for the difference is that with a b-aiiig credit constraint the fertilizer/land ratio decision cannot be separated from the land allocation decision. Given the assumption of increasing relative risk aversion, the larger farmers tend to risk a smaller proportion of their income by allocating relatively less land to the risky activity, which implies a higher input of fertilizer per acre. That the 1 See the analysis related to equation (17) above, and note that aB/ae <0 in thc present case.
17 Assuming x given at its optimal value, define F* such that B(e*) =0. Note that aB/ae <0, and thus (->F*)>B<0; (F,':*)>B>O. Assuming increasing relative risk aversion, (-U"-7-r/') >a* for E >e*, where a' is the measure of relative risk aversion and -U" `rIU' is evaluated at E. Sinilarly, (e<e*) (-U''.,rIUI<a*) . Ntultiplying both sides by B and moving U' to the right hand side of the inequality obtains -U"w ,rBB<aex U' B. Taking expectations of both sides and noting that a* is constant while E(U' B) 0 O (by equation (30)), the result is E(U"' rB)>0.
ADOPTION OF NEW TECHNOLOGY UNDER UNCERTAINTY
share of land planted to the modern crop (1*) is negatively related to farm size can be shown by calculating from equation (27) .
The share of the modern crop thus moves in a direction opposite to the intensity of fertilizer use, and in particular, if, relative risk aversion is increasing, the share of the modern crop declines as farm size increases.
The discussion is summarized in the following:
Assertion 10: With a binding credit constraint an increase in farm size will increase the fertilizerlland ratio and decrease the share of land planted to the modern crop if relative risk aversion is increasing with income.
The provision of more credit can be shown to induce higher levels of fertilizer per acre as well as increased acreage of the modern crop, given plausible conditions on the attitude towards risk: Differentiation of equation (30) with respect to k (implying an increase in the supply of credit per acre) yields
The denominator is positive, (by (31)), and the numerator is positive if absolute risk aversi n is not increasing and relative risk aversion not decreasing." 8 Moreover, the elasticity of x with respect to k is less than 1 (see Appendix B). Differentiating equation (27) with respect to k yields
As argued above the elasticity of x with respect to k is less than 1, and thus dL/dk >0. It immediately follows that increases in k also increase the total expected output (provided the assumptions regarding attitudes towards risk hold), as asserted below: 
Income distribution effects
The preceding discussion enables an assessment of income distribution effects related to the introduction of modern crops. Since the situation of all farmers, large or small, is improved, in absolute terms, it would make sense to concentrate on the relative impact. An appropriate index in this context may be the expected income per acre [E(7r) /IL] and its relation to farm size. If Eir/L is unaffected by farm size, then income distribution merely reflects land distribution. Obviously, in the framework of the model presented earlier, the situation that prevailed before the introduction of the modern crop was of such a nature, since the income per acre was R, irrespective of farm size. Once the modern crop is introduced, and assuming that credit is not binding, expected income per acre is given by
On the basis of Assertion 3, it follows that all terms on the right hand side of (37). except for 1*, are not affected by farm size. Considerifng Assertion 7, we may conclude that with constant relative risk aversion, income distribu tion is unaffected by the introduction of the modern crop (since in that case l* is constant). If relative risk aversion increases with income, then expected income per acre declines as farm size increases (since dl*/dL <0), and thus the modern crop improves income distribution.
Similar results are obtained for the case of an effective credit constraint: In that case, expected profit per acre is
From Assertion 1() it follows that E7r/L is constant when relative risk aversion is constant, while it declines when relative risk aversion is increasing, since
where the sign is established using equation (30) and Assertion 10. Given the assumption of increasing relative risk aversion the conclusion from these derivations is that the introduction of the modern crop improves income distribution even if there is a binding credit constraint. This is Ynot the general experience from the introduction of high yielding varieties, as argued by Lipton (1978, p. 326 ). It may be implied then, that in fact, in many areas credit is not proportional to farms size, but, rather, it increases more than proportionatelv with L. There are indications that in India this is indeed the case (Rao 1975, p. 138, Partlhasarathy and Prasad, 1978, p. 120) . Additional explanation for ncgative income distribution effects of modern crops (in areas where such effects are obscrved) may be the differential input and output prices faced by small and large farmers. Or, smaller farms may face more uncertainty (if their access to information is more limited), which can be shown to imply lower expected incomes, ceteris paribus.
ADOPTION OF NEW TECHNOLOGY UNDER UNCERTAINTY
Concluding remarks
While the present paper deals mainly with the role of risk-aversion and credit constraints in the production -decisions of farmers who grow both modern and traditional crops, the results are of relevance in a more general context. The underlying model can apply to a variety of topics involving risky production activities (whether a non-risky alternative activity is available or not). By incorporating a general formulation of a stochastic production function, the importance of inputs' risk a vis-a-vis output effects is emphasized and it can be shown that standard results do not necessarily hold.
In the specific case of the modern crop--traditional crop decision model, the analysis clarifies rigorously the effects of risk, risk aversion farm size and credit constraints on input use, output scale and crop mix decisions. While some of the results confirm intuitive arguments, this is not the case with other results, and deeper understanding of the underlying factors and their interrelations is required. Nonetheless these results are shown to depend on various behavioral or technical rules which have already been established in empirical studies or which are generally accepted (such as properties of utility functions). The paper thus helps to explain the sometimnes conflicting evidence on patterns of production by farms of different sizes, and in some cases refutes or qualifies common beliefs and traditional explanations. One has to recall, however, that not all aspects of the agricultural economic system were considered (such as land tenure, irrigation, labor constraints, etc.). The incorporation of additional elements in the analysis will undoubtedly add to our understanding of the system and may be worthwhile to pursue in detail. while average income is (in view of the fact that the mean of e is zero)
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Suppose that a small change in the level of x is imposed IL is unchanged), but at the same time a lump-sum cash subsidy (or tax) is being added to (or deducted from) the farmer's income, such that
dE(ir)=P L y'ydx--L dx+dS=()
where dS is the subsidy (or tax). This implies that mean income is unchanged, and a risk neutral farmer would thus be indifferent between the original level of x and the new level. The attitude Since h'>0 (see equation (Sc)), the direction of change is determined by the sign of E(U' e). Now, since h(x) is positive, and marginal utility declines with income (U"<0) it must hold that Thus it was established that an increase in x which is compensated so as to leave mean income unchanged (i.e., a mean-preserving-spread of the distribution of income) reduces expected utility and would be rejected by a risk-averse farmer. This implies that higher levels of x (ceteris paribus) are risk increasing.
A similar analysis can demonstrate that increases in L have the same property. Both terms in the denominator are positive (see (llb)). Note that
P*q-R-(l+r)-c x=-B+[Pq'-(1+r) c]Jx,
thus the numerator can be written as
-E(U" B 2 )+x E{U" B [P q'-(1+r) c]}
Obviously, -E(U"*B 2 )>o.
As for the second term, it can be rewritten as h'x *EU" 13 s +x [P 4 y'-(l+r) 
c] E(U" B).
The first item is negative by Feder (1977, Lemma 3) . The term [Py' -( + r) -c] can be shown to be positive by the maximizing expected utility of profit with respect to both x and L subject to the constraint cxL = kL. One of the first order conditions then implies x [P y'-(1 + r The discussion in the text asserts dx/dk >0. But on the other hand (;/[EU(tI "B 2 )J>0, and thus (k/x)(dx/dk)< 1.
